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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Clerk o t z Court

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER STRIKING PORTION OF
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

v.
Jack Leland Ray,

Case No. 20001027-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.
This matter is before the court on the State's motion to
strike the affidavit of Todd Gabler, contained in the addendum of
Appellant's amended brief as Exhibit 3. Additionally, the State
moves to strike all references to the affidavit in the brief.
"An appellate court's 'review is . . . limited to the
evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" State v. Plieao,
1999 UT 279, H7, 974 P.2d 279 (quoting Wilderness Blda. Sys.,
Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)). The affidavit
in the addendum of Appellant's amended brief was created between
the time Appellant filed his original brief on February 15, 2002
and the filing of Appellant's amended brief, on April 15, 2002.
Clearly, the affidavit is not part of the trial court record to
be reviewed on appeal by this court.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the affidavit of Todd Gabler
contained in the addendum of Appellant's amended brief is
stricken.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all references to the affidavit
contained in Appellant's amended brief are also stricken.
DATED this 30
FOR THE COURT

day of April, 2 0 02.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that on April 30, 2002, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
RICKY D BONEWELL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2 05 E TABERNACLE #2
ST GEORGE UT 84 770
JEANNE B. INOUYE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
Dated this April 30, 2002.

DepuKy Clerk
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Case No. 2000102/7-CA

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20001027-CA
vs.

Priority no. 2

JACK LELAND RAY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for: Case number 991500363, Count I:
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE,
a Second Degree Felony; Case number 991500364, Count I: UNLAWFUL SEXUAL
ACTIVITY WITH A MINOR, a Third Degree Felony; Case number 991500401, Count I:
THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE, a Second Degree Felony,
[consolidated for appeal into one case] in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for
Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable James L. Shumate, Judge, presiding.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

RICK D. BONEWELL
BONEWELL, MORRIS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
205 E. Tabernacle, Suite 2
St. George, UT 84770

Counsel for Appellee

Counsel for Appellant
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by §782a-3(2)(f), Utah code annotated, 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the strict compliance requirement of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule

11(e) met by the conjunction of Appellant's plea agreement and the Court's colloquy?
2.

Was there a violation of the due process clause of the Utah State Constitution

when the Court entered judgment on a motion by Appellant without having that motion
fully argued in open court?
3.

Was there ineffective assistance of counsel by the defense attorney for not waiving

a possible conflict in open court?
4.

Was there ineffective assistance of counsel by the defense attorney considering the

animosity that existed between the Appellant and his attorney?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the district court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural
requirements for an entry of a guilty plea is a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
State vs. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, % 10, 983 P.2d 556 (Utah 1999). The denial of
Appellant's motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a
clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision.
Benvenuto, id.; State vs. Holland, 921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996). Ineffective assistance of
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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counsel claims present a mixed question of law and fact. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d
516, 518 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Because there none of the issues presented involve matters that occurred on the
record, there was no need to preserve any of the arguments on the record.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11. Pleas.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the
right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial
jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses,
the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea,
these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all
those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and
if so, what agreement has been reached;
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the
defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the sworn
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the sworn statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into
or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with the following charges: In case number
991500363; Count I: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT
TO DISTRIBUTE, a first degree felony; Count II: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a second degree felony; and Count III:
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a class A misdemeanor.
In case number 991500364; Count I AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING, a first degree
felony; Count II: DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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ZONE, a first degree felony; Count III: DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, a first degree felony: Count IV: FORCIBLE
SEXUAL ABUSE, a second degree felony; Count V: DISTRIBUTION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE ZONE, a second degree felony; Count
VI: FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER, a class A misdemeanor; Count VII:
CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A MINOR, a class B misdemeanor.
In case number 991500366 ; Count I: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, a second degree felony; and Count II: POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA, a class A misdemeanor.
In case number 991500401 ; Count I: THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR
VEHICLE, a second degree felony; Count II: THEFT, a second degree felony; Count III:
THEFT, a third degree felony; Count TV: COMMUNICATION FRAUD, a second degree
felony; and Count V: COMMUNICATION FRAUD, a third degree felony.
The Appellant entered into a plea agreement before the honorable Judge James L.
Shumate at which point the Appellant pled no contest to a second degree felony, possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in case number 991500363. Appellant
also pled no contest to a third degree felony, unlawful sexual activity with a minor, in case
number 991500364. Appellant also pled no contest to a second degree felony, theft of an
operable motor vehicle, in case number 991500401. All other charges were dismissed in
conjunction with entering into the plea agreement.
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April and May of 1999, the Appellant was charged with numerous first and second
degree felonies, in separate cases. On May 17, 2000, the Appellant, Jack Leland Ray, with
Bryan Jackson as his counsel present, entered a no contest plea to a (Change of Plea, May
17,2000, Page 10, Lines 16-20), a no contest plea to (Change of Plea, May 17, 2000, Page
10, Lines 21-24), and a no contest plea (Change of Plea, May 17, 2000, Page 10, Line 25;
Page 11, Lines 1-3), thereby disposing of all other charges in the three cases. During the
plea hearing, the Court reviewed the constitutional rights Mr. Ray was waiving by pleading
to the three charges (Change of Plea, May 17, 2000, Page 6, Line 10, through Page 7, Line
22). The Court did not specifically address the fact that the Appellant's right to appeal
would be limited after entering the pleas. Judge Shumate did review with Mr. Ray the
written plea agreement, advising the Appellant of his constitutional rights and that those
rights would be waived (Change of Plea, May 17, 2000, Page 6, Line 10, through Page 7,
Line 22). Mr. Ray had initialed and signed the agreement and the Court confirmed with the
Appellant that he had read each paragraph, understood them, and was agreeing to be bound
by the agreements (Change of Plea, May 17, 2000, Page 7, Lines 17-25 ).
On October 25,2000, the Appellant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms on the
felony convictions (Sentencing Hearing, October 25, 2000, Page 16, Lines 19-25). On
November 27,2000, Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on the Appellant's behalf
and then withdrew from the cases. On January 10, 2001, the Court held a hearing on the
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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status of Appellant's counsel and his appeal. The Court appointed Bryan Harris as counsel
at that time (Review Hearing, January 10, 2001, Page 4, Lines 1-3). Due to some possible
conflicts between Mr. Harris and Mr. Ray, Mr. Harris was allowed to withdraw and the
Court eventually appointed Rick Bonewell to represent Mr. Ray. On August 16,2001, Mr.
Bonewell filed motions to withdraw the pleas in all three cases. On September 7, 2001,
Judge Shumate heard argument on Mr. Ray's motions and on September 12, 2001 Judge
Shumate entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law on motion to set aside plea. The
Court of Appeals consolidated the three cases into this one appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: Was the strict compliance requirement of rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure met by the conjunction of Appellants plea agreement and the judge's colloquy?
Point II. Was there a violation of the due process clause of the Utah State Constitution when
the Court entered judgment on a motion by Appellant without having that motion fully
argued in open court?
Point IIL Was there ineffective assistance of counsel by the defense attorney for not waiving
a possible conflict in open court?
Point IV: Was there ineffective assistance of counsel, given the level of animosity that
existed prior to sentencing between the defense attorney and the defendant/appellant?

State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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ARGUMENT

I.

WAS THE STRICT COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT OF UTAH RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 11(e) MET BY THE CONJUNCTION OF
Appellants PLEA AGREEMENT AND THE JUDGE'S COLLOQUY?
As referenced in the Statement of Facts, the colloquy that was used by Judge Shumate

did not include key information, namely the specific information regarding the Appellant's
right to appeal. This information was included in the plea affidavit, however, but was never
discussed on the record in the colloquy between the Court and the Appellant.
It is well established that "[s]trict compliance with rule 11(e) creates a presumption
that the plea was voluntarily entered." State vs. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,ffif11, 1 P.3d 1108.
However, as the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out in State vs. Visser,
We have described the court's duty in this regard as a duty of "strict"
compliance. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996);
[State vs.JAbeyta, 852 P.2d at 995. Strict compliance, however, does not
mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the rights listed. SeeAbeyta,
852 P.2d at 996; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991). We thus
reemphasize that the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants
know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their
decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or undermined
by formalistic ritual.
22 P.3d 1242, 2000 UT 88 (Utah 11/14/2000).
The argument justifying the trial court failing to review orally with the Appellant one
of the areas specified by Rule 11(e) is that, between the affidavit used for Appellant's entry
ofplea and the oral colloquy used by the trial court, the Appellant was substantially informed
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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of his rights, and that the trial court could reasonably regard the Appellant's plea as being
voluntary and intelligent, understanding the consequences of his plea.
The Visser case, however, is distinguishablefromthe present case. In Visser, the trial
court did not, in its oral colloquy, review the Appellant's right to a speedy trial. However,
this was done at mid-point in the trial. As was noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Visser,
Ibid,
We . . . hold that the trial court's colloquy, in light of the mid-trial context of
the plea, provided an adequate basis in the record to conclude that the trial
court strictly
complied with rule 11.
* * *

Visser's trial had already begun. As there is no allegation that the
commencement of the trial or its proceedings to that point were not timely, we
must assume that Visser had already actually received the essential benefit of
his right to a speedy trial. Although we have found that there are other discrete
aspects to the right to a speedy trial, such as the right to a prompt sentencing,
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380,1385 (Utah 1986), we have never held that the
individual aspects of the speedy trial right must be separately communicated.
Hence, the recitation, either orally or by affidavit, that Visser had the "right to
a speedy trial," would have communicated no more than his actual trial
experience to that point.
Visser, Id., emphasis added.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals mainly because the factual
circumstances existed in Visser that obviated the need for a complete recital of the right to
a speedy trial. Hence, given that the special factual circumstances that led the Utah Supreme
Court to reverse the Court of Appeals are not present, it is appropriate to review the language
the Court of Appeals used in its review of the Visser case:
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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Although a rigid colloquy or rote recitation of the elements of Rule 11 is not
required, see State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1993); State v.
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991), a record of compliance with Rule
11 (e) must nonetheless be established by means of a plea colloquy between the
trial court and the defendant, at which the trial court must ensure that the
defendant's guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. See Gibbons, 740
P.2d at 1314. Rule 11(e) "requires the trial court [during the plea colloquy] to
find that seven detailed and specific criteria have been fulfilled." Maguire, 830
P.2d at 218. It is imperative that "no requirement of the rule" be omitted by the
trial court. Id.
Visser, 973 P.2d 998, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Utah App. 01/28/1999).
In the instant case, the entry of plea was held during a standard hearing. It is clear,
from the tenor of the trial court, that this plea would need to be backed by a good record.
As the trial court noted,
Mr. Ray, as you have seen, probably to your great distress over the months, we
have to make a careful record on this. So let's start doing it now. Mr. Shaum
[the prosecutor] is going to tell me which of these cases is going to resolve in
which fashion. And I want you to listen carefully to make sure that we all
understand them in the same way.
Change of Plea, May 17, 2000, p. 3, LI. 8-13.
The judge, however, did not review with the Appellant his right to appeal; a right
which , in hindsight, has ended up being a rather important right for him to understand.
The importance of a plea colloquy was discussed most importantly in the United
States Supreme Court case of Boykin vs. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.
2d 274 (1969). In that case, the US Supreme Court noted something that is often left out of
the analysis:
A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did
various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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determine punishment. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223.
Admissibility of a confession must be based on a "reliable determination on
the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the
defendant." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387. The requirement that the
prosecution spread on the record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no
constitutional innovation. In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,516, we dealt
with a problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right. We
held: "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record
must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understanding^ rejected the
offer. Anything less is not waiver."
* * *

What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes
and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a
record adequate for any review that may be later sought {Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157,173; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,610), and forestalls the
spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.
It is indeed important to view the entry of a plea as a result of a plea agreement as being the
same as a guilty verdict from a jury. It is a conviction. And the record must show that the
Trial Court, in its colloquy, made sure that the Appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered
his plea. This burden is specifically placed on the Trial Court, not on the prosecutor, who
prepares the affidavit for entry of plea, nor on the defense attorney, who hopefully has
discussed this affidavit with his client. This does, indeed take time; however, as the Utah
Supreme Court has noted, "constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in the name ofjudicial
economy." State vs. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1987). Hence,
we respectfully request that this Court allow the Appellant to withdraw his plea, and be given
the opportunity for a trial on the merits of his case.

State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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POINT IL

WAS THERE A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION WHEN THE COURT ENTERED
JUDGMENT ON A MOTION BY APPELLANT WITHOUT HAVING
THAT MOTION FULLY ARGUED IN OPEN COURT?

Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11 states in pertinent part:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay . . . .
The Appellant was not given an opportunity to present the argument in favor of his Motion
to Withdraw No Contest Plea. In the first instance of Appellant's attempt at requesting that
he withdraw his no contest pleas, even Appellant's counsel was making the argument halfheartedly; counsel responds to the Trial Court's concerns of untimeliness with the remark,
"It's clearly beyond the time/date, Your Honor." Sentencing Transcript, October 25,2000,
p. 5, LI. 24-25. The Trial Court ultimately found that the motion was '"untimely" and was
overruled. Sentencing Transcript, October 25, 2000, p. 12, LI. 14-15.
The Trial Court was in a different state of mind when this was reviewed in 2001. By
that time, the case of State vs. Ostler, had issued the following holding:
we hold that the thirty-day limitation on the filing of a motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty or no contest runs from the date of final disposition of the case
at the district court. We overrule the holding in State v, Price, 837 P.2d 578
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), that section 77-13-6fs thirty-day limitation on filing a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea runs from the date of Ihe plea colloquy.
State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d 528, 2001 UT 68 (Utah 08/10/2001).
In holding that the Appellant's ill-presented Motion to Withdraw plea was overruled,
the Court was using the holding of State vs. Price to determine whether or not the motion
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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was timely. After Ostler, Appellant tried to re-instate his motions to withdraw pleas. A
hearing was held on this matter on September 7,2001, which focused mainly on the question
of whether or not the substantive protections of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
had been met by the Trial Court. However, the Trial Court here as well simply focused on
the untimeliness of the new Motions to Withdraw the Pleas, rather than giving the Appellant
and his counsel a chance to argue the motion.
POINT III. WAS THERE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY THE
DEFENSE ATTORNEY FOR NOT WAIVING A POSSIBLE
CONFLICT IN OPEN COURT?
The right to conflict-free representation is guaranteed by Ihe Sixth Amendment. See
Holloway vs Arkansas, 434 U.S. 474 (1977); United States vs Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 790
(10th Cir. 1985). However, this in order for Appellant to prevail, he has to be able to show
that his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest, and that the conflict adversely affected
his counsel's performance. See State vs. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681,686 (Utah 1997). To establish
an actual conflict of interest, the Appellant must show that his trial counsel had to make
choices that would advance his own interests to the detriment of the Appellant's. See Id.
After honestly reviewing the record, nothing can be found that shows that Appellant's trial
counsel's performance was affected by the conflict, if in fact there was a conflict. The
potential conflict arises due to the fact that trial counsel represented Appellant's sister,
Marjorie Retzlaff, in a matter in the juvenile court of Washington County. See Minutes of
Juvenile Court Hearing, In Re: Shane Retzlaff, dated 13 March 2000, attached hereto as
State vs. Jack Leland Ray - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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Exhibit One. Ms. Retzlaff was a co-Defendant in one of Appellant's criminal cases. Ms.
Retzlaff was represented by different counsel in the companion criminal case.
However, this potential conflict-that is, representing a co-defendant in another court
matter at the same time as representing the Appellant in his matters - is the kind of conflict
that should, at a minimum, be waived on the record. This was not done, and the failure to
do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
POINT IV:

WAS THERE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, GIVEN THE
LEVEL OF ANIMOSITY THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO SENTENCING
BETWEEN
THE D E F E N S E A T T O R N E Y
AND
THE
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, AND THE FAILURE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT TO INQUIRE AS TO THE CONFLICT?

On another point, Appellant also claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel, given
the level of animosity that existed between the Appellant and his trial counsel. This
animosity is shown in several ways. First, at the sentencing hearing, Appellant's trial
counsel noted that the Appellant had filed a bar complaint against him. The Appellant
agreed that there had been problems, and that the Appellant had hired a private investigator.
Sentencing Transcript, p. 3, L. 8 - p. 4, L. 6. The Appellant never said that the problems
were resolved, or that the reason for the bar complaint had been handled. The Trial Court
did not pursue this issue further, as perhaps it should have, to ensure that there were no
lasting problems existing between the Appellant and his attorney.
The Appellant was before the Court being sentenced on three felony counts. It is
certainly a situation that is tense, and that the Appellant would need an advocate beside him.
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However, just prior to the sentencing, his Trial Counsel sent to the Appellant a harshly
worded letter, predicting that the judge would sentence the Appellant to consecutive prison
terms, and that the Appellant would deserve it. See Letter of Jackson to Ray, 11 Aug 2000,
attached hereto as Exhibit Two. Counsel also noted hisfrustrationwith the Appellant by
telling the Court at sentencing, "I know the county attorney's office feels like they have seen
enough of Mr. Ray. They don't want to see any more of him. And I feel the same way."
Sentencing Transcript, p. 11, LI. 17-18, emphasis added.
As has been discussed above, to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a high burden
needs to be met. The US Supreme Court has laid out the burden an appellant has in appealing
a matter based upon ineffective assistance of counsel:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First,
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
The Utah Supreme Court has followed this formula in determining ineffective
assistance of counsel. See State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (1984). However, when there is
animosity between the Appellant and his trial counsel, a different standard comes in. As the
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U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted,
We think, however, that to compel one charged with grievous crime to
undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become
embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance
of any counsel whatsoever. See Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S. Ct.
1402,18 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct.
792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963).
The problem arises because the state court did not, in our opinion, take the
necessary time and conduct such necessary inquiry as might have eased
Brown's dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.
Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970)(emphasis added).
This case was cited favorably by the Utah Supreme Court, which held:
We adhere to the rule that "to compel one charged with grievous crime to
undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become
embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive of the effective assistance of
any counsel whatsoever." Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.
1970).
State vs. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982).
Hence, it is clear that an interpersonal animosity between a man charged with a
serious crime and his counsel should raise red flags with the trial court, which should first
seek to insure that the Appellant is being adequately represented, and not just judicial
economy. Even after being given a clear indication of the problems between the Appellant
and his trial counsel, no colloquy was done, no further questioning by the trial court to
ensure that the Appellant was being adequately represented.
This animosity led to the Trial Counsel refusing to file a motion to withdraw pleas as
well as a notice of appeal in this case. See Affidavit of Todd Gabler, attached hereto as
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Exhibit Three and incorporated in this brief by this reference. Granted, the challenged act
of omission might be considered sound trial strategy. State vs Pecht, 2002 UT 20 (Ut. App.
2002), citing State vs Parker, 2000 UT 51, 4 P.3d 778 (Utah 2000). However, this goes
beyond what occurred at trial; Trial Counsel refused to do what his client asked him to do
and reasonably expected him to do, because of the animosity. The animosity also led to
counsel's lackluster presentation of the motion to withdraw pleas, as noted above.
To be an effective attorney for a man charged with a serious crime, the trial counsel
also has to remember his role in the courts. As noted by Wood decision,
...an attorney acts as an assistant for his client, and not as a master
The
counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the "assistance" of
counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language
and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other
defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing
defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling
defendant and his right to defend himself personally.
Wood, ibid*
While this Court has noted that
proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but
must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v- Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah
1993) (footnote omitted); see also Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441 (stating
speculative claims "cannot substitute for proof of prejudice")
State vs. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355 (2001)
the tenor of counsel's letter to the Appellant, coming just two months prior to the sentencing
that counsel predicted would result in consecutive prison sentences, surely should raise the
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question of that trial counsel's willingness to be his client's assistant, and not "master".
Appellant asks the court to allow him to withdraw his pleas and be represented by an
attorney dedicated to being his advocate, and to presenting a case where he does not already
show an extreme prejudice against the client.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests that this Court find that the Trial Court
was in error when it would not allow the Appellant to withdraw his plea, and that the pleas
be ordered withdrawn and the case remanded for appropriate action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /#

day of April, 2002.

RICKD.BONEWELL
Attorney for appellant
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ADDENDUMS
Exhibit One: Minutes of Juvenile Court proceeding
Exhibit Two: Letter of Jackson to Ray
IC/sIiibit Thrrv Afliihn il ul'TiiiM i iuhU i

State vs. Jack LelandRay - BRIEF OF APPELLANT

T>«^r^

1Q

FILED
FIFTH BTST1UCT JUVENILE COURT
MAR
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Q

5th Districten<i' '•"'
STATE OF UTAH, In The Interest Of

\

JUTE S H E E T

I
I
I
I
I

->
,r lilil/A
--H/'
UOii
'7-09-95

|
|
i '
j_

A Person Under the A<*e of IS years
I>A H Oe t u ; n M •-

('ASK NO: 973959' .
Tape #: 00-051 Count: 1081-2423 •'
__
'

-n A^V i

s*.

* >

PERSONS PRESENT: Marjorie RetzlafT, mother, Robert Smith, Assistant State Attorney
General; Bryan Jackson, attorney for mother; Karla Staheli, Guardiai I Ad Litem, Tom Kelly.
DCFS;'Chad Utley, attorney for father; Lori & Brian Koehler; aunt & uncle, Alesha &. Ti:* .•:••
Koehler, cousins; Sheryl Parker, aunt; Kyle & Lori Ann Parker; cousins; Larry Parkei,
grandfather; Mae Parker, grandmother; Kathy Hatfield, aunt; David Ilatfield, cousin, Michael
Callahan, family friend; Kenneth Ray, grandfather; M. Susan Ray, grandmother; Patrick Wellman,
mother's employer; JeffGoble, family friend; Mark Simpson, Coi irt Bailiff.
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This matter comes before the Com t for a Review as requested by the State Attorney
General and to address a Motion for Tempoiary Custody and Request for Hearing whiclI was
filed by March 8, 2000 bv Ch:v! 1 Mlev, attorney foi Lany • Packer.
. .A\ i y :\ 1'arker has been established as the natural father oi Shane RetzlafT through
r - " - ' • : ! paternity tests. He is requesting that custody of Shane be vested with him.
ivobert Smith informs the Court that a home study of Larry Parker was coinpicicu i.,.u iy
i'arker lesides in Mojave Valley, AZ. Mr. Smith indicates that it would be in the best interest of
Shane to be out of foster care, pending permanency hearing. He indicates that Marjorie RetzlafT,
Shane's mother is in compliance witl I requirements of family reunification. Mr. Smith
recommends that Shane be allowed to live with his father with visitation allowed by the mother
•pending the permanency hearing.
Bryan Jackson, attorney ior tin- moihoi, equests that the child be placed with the mother
before ihe is allowed to go with the fathei as to give the mother the chance to reestablish hei
relationship with Shane and allow the mother to get the child use lo the fact that Mi Paiker ;s his
father before actually going w» hve with the father.

EXHIBIT!

SHANE RETZLAFF
CASENO. 973959
MARCH 13, 2000
MINUTES - PAGE 2
Karla Staheli recommends that the child be allowed to stay with the father for about two
weeks and then come back to a shoit visit, with the mother and then evaluate Shane's static with
the father
nrurr: m r r o T u r x m c -

- that based oastipulation of the parties as v, en as -j;-...u; pai ~rmiy ICSLS, I-L-J L.ATV
A iiu •;<)m Parker is the natural father of Shane Retzlalf;
- that it is appropriate and in Shane's best interest that Shane visit with his father for the
next month.
Titw ( , ni" i :vr ORDERS;
- that Shane is allowed to go to Arizona with his father, Larry Amnion Parker to remain
there for one month's visitation;
that during the month visitation, Shane's mother is entitled visitation for a four-day
period to take place in the middle of the month;
- that during the four-day visitation with tl
* .\ •
presence of the mother and Shane,
that both the inother and the father arc to share the costs ol transporting Shane Pack to
Utah and then back to Arizona for purposes of the visitation;
" - that Shane's custody is to remain with DCFS pending trial/ permanency oi dei ;
- that at the end of the month visitation of Shane with his father, Shane is to be returned to
stay with the"mother for a month period with the father entitled to a four-day visit during said
month;"' If this matter has not been resolved by that time, this visitation schedule will continue,,.
- that the mother continue to comply with the reunification service plan.
- that both parents are to share the costs incurred by the child custody evaluatoi ;•
,- that the Motion for Temporary Custody and Request for Hearing filed by Chad I Jtley
and dated March 13, 2000 will be addressed after DCFS reunification services have ended.
- that both parents are allowed liberal telephone contact with Shane
- that Shane is allowed to visit with his mother tor.: diort t;;me befoit ;ie leaw:, u r
Arizona with his father;
- that both parents are to retrain noin Lalkmg LO Shane about any pai t of this pending
matter including no derogatory remarks are to he made about either parent.
- that fuither hearing on this matter will IK; held on Apiil 1 ! ?.()00;
- that a niahfor permanent custody will he held on May '.M, 2000 at 10.a.m.
IRTHER ORDER ED that the Attorney. General is to prepare a written order

SHANE RETZLAFF
CASE NO 973Q5Q
M\RCH 13,2000
MINUTES - PAGE 3
consistent ivith the Couit's luluig, in accordance with Rule 4 5 4 of the Code of Judicial
Ad nimisl ration
Copy mailed this 15th day of Mauh 2000, to the Attorney Gineial pei his request, a copy

tl ftryan d <u;ksu
Attorney At I .aw '
'O. Box 519
CecUi City. Utah 84721

(435) 586-8450

August 11, 2000

JACK RAY'
WASHINGTON COUN1Y PUKU/".
750 South 5400 West
-i -
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K L . J a CK hi ib i i i u b i g tii'Tie.

Dear Jack:
I know you have made seven
, io tu ti y ai id coi rtact my office everyc.; ?. .
^ m not accepting your calls at this ti...^. ; v\;il review the presentence investigation
ort with you when it. is completed. I know what you'are trying to do witf \ T ommy and
*rs However, everybody has a pretty good idea wt 10 they are dealing with. The '
fact is Jack >ow had the one golden moment, that last opportunity before]laving the
door slammed shut tight in your'face, never to be opened again," and you blew it. You
will not be able to lie yourself out of this one. Everyone in Washington County knows
that you are compulsive liar,.,. I was the last poor fool who believed in you,,,., Y01 1 may
think me funny or foolish, for doing so.., However, those attorney's less naive than
myself in whose eyes your reputation proceeds you,, only speak of you in joking cir cles.
I was the only person who took you problem seriously. 1 hey will certainly not do now.
Now you wish to call my office attempting to convince my secretary tllat. this was some
•grand clips conspiracy the whole world is lying except Jack Ray! Frankly, Jack, yoi 1
have a serious probi
!• nope that you are able to get the help that you need in
prison. I don't think there is any doubt that you will go to prison, given the look on
Judge Shumates face at our last hearing. The only question that remains and it is one
for you to.decide,, is how this matter should be argued before Judge Shumate that the
sentences should run ..concurrently (in which case you may or lly have to serve tei 1 (10).
years in prison) or the sentences'should run. consecutively, (ii i which case it would not
• sui prise me if Judge Shumate recommended that you serve evei yday of the sentence
for total of thirty-five (35)' years). I suppose that you should be congratulated Jack. In
the two and half (2 '%) months that yoi i were released form jail at your own doing i \o
do"^* ^ - ^ I heat d

EXHIBIT 2

JACK RAY
August 11,2000
Dono 7

this one from Sam as well) you have managed to finagle yourself from a chance of
being placed on probation to taking the full lease on life tlirough the installment plan
with a thirty-five"(35) year prison sentence all because you thought you were a little
smarter than law enforcement, your attorney and Judge Shumate. Yes, Jack you oi ight
to be proud of yourself. You really have accomplished everything you have set out to
do,.,. You deserve everything thatyou have worked so hard to get,,,, I know it, is hard for
you to stay humble and remain composed.when in the presence of myself orothers of
similar feeble mindedness. Yes Jack if it wasn't for your wit and determination I would
dare say you would not be where you are today, When I have tlle information
necessary to review with you atthe time of sentencing, I will make it a point to discuss it
with you in detail Until such time, 1 suggest that you kick back and relax, enjoy tl le
spoils of yot jr owr i grandeu- : . i rest assured in the comfor t, and peace of mind of.
i f !i
knowing that yoi i will i lev-5 *
~ ve oi itside prison walls again for at least for a very
long time.
/
W r v tnilv(voU rQ

ANNJACKSON
Counsel
JBJ:blk

Rick D.BoneweM 7815
BONEWELL, MORRIS & ASSOCIATES LLC
-Southern Utah Branch
205 E Tabernacle, Ste 2
St. George, UT 84770
(435)688-7117
fax(415)6R8'MP 0
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while working diuing my investigations for Mr. Ray, I met both Jack Ray and Brian Jackson oi. :
couple of occasions. I remember speaking; with Jack Ray on a separate occasion L: \\:^A . .
...-. ; *^a. :.:x .M-..

! ?^ ' ^ If^itn lacksoii to liave Jack's Pleas withdrawn and that he

had entered into this I1 lea Agreement so tl tat he could be released from jail and hopeflilly find
witnesses that could support his case
R\:> iwar i!.>- J

'N:

L \ .) n^u- ).-..* - -MU ;. .

,,nhe 70-day limitation. Jack definitely indicated that he waited Brian

Jackson to withdraw the Pleas rather than go to sentencing. I also spoke with Brian Jackson

EXHIBIT 3

regarding the withdrawal of Pleas and while Brian indicated that Jack wanted the Pleas to be
withdrawn, it simply was not going to happen. I remember that the relationship between Brian
Jackson and Jack Ray was less than amicable and Brian Jackson was not even speaking with Jack
at one point.
The foregoing information is true & correct and based upon Affiant's own knowledge and
information, except where expressly stated upon belief or attributed to another source.

DATED this 2nd

day of

April

_, 2002.
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Notary Public
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State of Utah
My Commission Expires Nov. 5,2004
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